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deserved punishment has not the least reason to reckon upon this。
Punishment； then； is a physical evil； which； though it be not
connected with moral evil as a natural consequence； ought to be
connected with it as a consequence by the principles of a moral
legislation。 Now； if every crime； even without regarding the
physical consequence with respect to the actor； is in itself
punishable； that is； forfeits happiness （at least partially）； it is
obviously absurd to say that the crime consisted just in this； that be
has drawn punishment on himself； thereby injuring his private
happiness （which； on the principle of self…love； must be the proper
notion of all crime）。 According to this view； the punishment would
be the reason for calling anything a crime； and justice would； on
the contrary； consist in omitting all punishment； and even
preventing that which naturally follows； for； if this were done； there
would no longer be any evil in the action； since the harm which
otherwise followed it； and on account of which alone the action was
called evil； would now be prevented。 To look； however； on all
rewards and punishments as merely the machinery in the hand of a
higher power； which is to serve only to set rational creatures
striving after their final end （happiness）； this is to reduce the will
to a mechanism destructive of freedom； this is so evident that it need
not detain us。
More refined； though equally false； is the theory of those who
suppose a certain special moral sense； which sense and not reason
determines the moral law； and in consequence of which the
consciousness of virtue is supposed to be directly connected with
contentment and pleasure； that of vice； with mental dissatisfaction
and pain； thus reducing the whole to the desire of private
happiness。 Without repeating what has been said above； I will here
only remark the fallacy they fall into。 In order to imagine the
vicious man as tormented with mental dissatisfaction by the
consciousness of his transgressions； they must first represent him
as in the main basis of his character； at least in some degree；
morally good； just as he who is pleased with the consciousness of
right conduct must be conceived as already virtuous。 The notion of
morality and duty must； therefore； have preceded any regard to this
satisfaction； and cannot be derived from it。 A man must first
appreciate the importance of what we call duty； the authority of the
moral law； and the immediate dignity which the following of it gives
to the person in his own eyes； in order to feel that satisfaction in
the consciousness of his conformity to it and the bitter remorse
that acpanies the consciousness of its transgression。 It is；
therefore； impossible to feel this satisfaction or dissatisfaction
prior to the knowledge of obligation； or to make it the basis of the
latter。 A man must be at least half honest in order even to be able to
form a conception of these feelings。 I do not deny that as the human
will is； by virtue of liberty； capable of being immediately determined
by the moral law； so frequent practice in accordance with this
principle of determination can； at least； produce subjectively a
feeling of satisfaction； on the contrary； it is a duty to establish
and to cultivate this； which alone deserves to be called properly
the moral feeling； but the notion of duty cannot be derived from it；
else we should have to suppose a feeling for the law as such； and thus
make that an object of sensation which can only be thought by the
reason； and this； if it is not to be a flat contradiction； would
destroy all notion of duty and put in its place a mere mechanical play
of refined inclinations sometimes contending with the coarser。
If now we pare our formal supreme principle of pure practical
reason （that of autonomy of the will） with all previous material
principles of morality； we can exhibit them all in a table in which
all possible cases are exhausted； except the one formal principle； and
thus we can show visibly that it is vain to look for any other
principle than that now proposed。 In fact all possible principles of
determination of the will are either merely subjective； and
therefore empirical； or are also objective and rational； and both
are either external or internal。
Practical Material Principles of Determination taken as the
Foundation of Morality； are：
SUBJECTIVE。
EXTERNAL INTERNAL
Education Physical feeling
（Montaigne） （Epicurus）
The civil Moral feeling
Constitution （Hutcheson）
（Mandeville）
OBJECTIVE。
INTERNAL EXTERNAL
Perfection Will of God
（Wolf and the （Crusius and other
Stoics） theological Moralists）
Those of the upper table are all empirical and evidently incapable
of furnishing the universal principle of morality； but those in the
lower table are based on reason （for perfection as a quality of
things； and the highest perfection conceived as substance； that is；
God； can only be thought by means of rational concepts）。 But the
former notion； namely； that of perfection； may either be taken in a
theoretic signification； and then it means nothing but the
pleteness of each thing in its own kind （transcendental）； or that
of a thing merely as a thing （metaphysical）； and with that we are
not concerned here。 But the notion of perfection in a practical
sense is the fitness or sufficiency of a thing for all sorts of
purposes。 This perfection； as a quality of man and consequently
internal； is nothing but talent and； what strengthens or pletes
this； skill。 Supreme perfection conceived as substance； that is God；
and consequently external （considered practically）； is the sufficiency
of this being for all ends。 Ends then must first be given；
relatively to which only can the notion of perfection （whether
internal in ourselves or external in God） be the determining principle
of the will。 But an end… being an object which must precede the
determination of the will by a practical rule and contain the ground
of the possibility of this determination； and therefore contain also
the matter of the will； taken as its determining principle… such an
end is always empirical and； therefore； may serve for the Epicurean
principle of the happiness theory； but not for the pure rational
principle of morality and duty。 Thus； talents and the improvement of
them； because they contribute to the advantages of life； or the will
of God； if agreement with it be taken as the object of the will；
without any antecedent independent practical principle； can be motives
only by reason of the happiness expected therefrom。 Hence it
follows； first； that all the principles here stated are material；
secondly； that they include all possible material principles； and；
finally； the conclusion； that since material principles are quite
incapable of furnishing the supreme moral law （as has been shown）； the
formal practical principle the pure reason （according to which the
mere form of a universal legislation must constitute the supreme and
immediate determining principle of the will） is the only one
possible which is adequate to furnish categorical imperatives； that
is； practical laws （which make actions a duty）； and in general to
serve as the principle of morality； both in criticizing conduct and
also in its application to the human will to determine it。
I。 Of the Deduction of the Fundamental Principles of Pure
Practical Reason。
This Analytic shows that pure reason can be practical； that is；
can of itself determine the will independently of anything
empirical； and this it proves by a fact in which pure reason in us
proves itself actually practical； namely； the autonomy shown in the
fundamental principle of morality； by which reason determines the will
to action。
It shows at the same time that this fact is inseparably connected
with the consciousness of freedom of the will； nay； is identical
with it； and by this the will of a rational being； although as
belonging to the world of sense it recognizes itself as necessarily
subject to the laws of causality like other efficient causes； yet；
at the same time； on another side； namely； as a being in itself； is
conscious of existing in and being determined by an intelligible order
of things； conscious not by virtue of a special intuition of itself；
but by virtue of certain dynamical laws which determine its
causality in the sensible world； for it has been elsewhere proved that
if freedom is predicated of us； it transports us into an
intelligible order of things。
Now； if we pare with this the analytical part of the critique
of pure speculative reason； we shall see a remarkable contrast。
There it was not fundamental principles； but pure； sensible
intuition （space and time）； that was the first datum that made a
priori knowledge possible； though only of objects of the senses。
Synthetical principles could not be derived from mere concepts without
intuition； on the contrary； they could only exist with reference to
this intuition； and therefore to objects of possible experience； since
it is the concepts of the understanding； united with this intuition；
which alone make that knowledge possible which we call experience。
Beyond objects of experience； and therefore with regard to things as
noumena； all positive knowledge was rightly disclaimed for speculative
reason。 This reason； however； went so far as to establish with
certainty the concept of noumena； that is； the possibility； nay； the
necessity； of thinking them； for example； it showed against all
objections that the supposition of freedom； negatively considered； was
quite consistent with those principles and limitations of pure
theoretic reason。 But it could not give us any definite enlargement of
our knowledge with respect to such objects； but； on the contrary；
cut off all view of them altogether。
On the other hand； the moral law； although it gives no view； yet
gives us a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the
sensible world； and the whole pass of our theoretical use of
reason； a fact which points to a pure world of the understanding； nay；
even defines it positively and enables us to know something of it；
namely； a law。
This law （as far as rational beings are concerned） gives to the
world of sense； which is a sensible system of nature； the form of a
world of the understanding； that is； of a supersensible system of
nature； without interfering with its mechanism。 Now； a system of
nature； in the most general sense； is the existence of things under
laws。 The sensible nature of rational beings in general is their
existence under laws empirically conditioned； which； from the point of
view of reason； is heteronomy。 The supersensible nature of the same
beings； on the other hand； is their existence according to laws
which are independent of every empirical condition and； therefore；
belong to the autonomy of pure reason。 And； since the laws by which
the existence of things depends on cognition are practical；
supersensible nature； so far as we can form any notion of it； is
nothing else than a system of nature under the autonomy of pure
practical reason。 Now； the law of this autonomy is the moral law；
which； therefore； is the fundamental law of a supersensible nature；
and of a pure world of understanding； whose counterpart must exist
in the world of sense； but without interfering with its laws。 We might
call the former the archetypal world （natura archetypa）； which we only
know in the reason； and the latter the ectypal world （natura
ectypa）； because it contains the possible effect of the idea of the
former which is the determining principle of the will。 For the moral
law； in fact； transfers us ideally into a system in which pure reason；
if it were acpanied with adequate physical power； would produce the
summum bonum； and it determines our will to give the sensible world
the form of a system of rational beings。
The least attention to oneself proves that this idea really serves
as the model for the determinations of our will。
When the maxim which I am disposed to follow in giving testimony
is tested by the practical reason； I always consider what it would
be if it were to hold as a universal law of nature。 It is manifest
that in this view it would oblige everyone to speak the truth。 For
it cannot hold as a universal law of nature that statements should
be allowed to have the force of proof and yet to be purposely
untrue。 Similarly； the maxim which I adopt with respect to disposing
freely of my life is at once determined； when I ask myself what it
should be； in order that a system； of which it is the law； should
maintain itself。 It is obvious that in such a system no one could
arbitrarily put an end to his own life； for such an arrangement
would not be a permanent order of things。 And so in all similar cases。
Now； in nature； as it actually is an object of experience； the free
will is not of itself determined to maxims which could of themselves
be the foundation of a natural system of unive