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practical laws； but above all practically restrictive laws； and
consequently above obligation and duty。 This holiness of will is；
however； a practical idea； which must necessarily serve as a type to
which finite rational beings can only approximate indefinitely； and
which the pure moral law； which is itself on this account called holy；
constantly and rightly holds before their eyes。 The utmost that finite
practical reason can effect is to be certain of this indefinite
progress of one's maxims and of their steady disposition to advance。
This is virtue； and virtue； at least as a naturally acquired
faculty； can never be perfect； because assurance in such a case
never bees apodeictic certainty and； when it only amounts to
persuasion； is very dangerous。
VIII。 THEOREM IV。
The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and
of all duties which conform to them； on the other hand； heteronomy
of the elective will not only cannot be the basis of any obligation；
but is； on the contrary； opposed to the principle thereof and to the
morality of the will。
In fact the sole principle of morality consists in the
independence on all matter of the law （namely； a desired object）；
and in the determination of the elective will by the mere universal
legislative form of which its maxim must be capable。 Now this
independence is freedom in the negative sense； and this
self…legislation of the pure； and therefore practical； reason is
freedom in the positive sense。 Thus the moral law expresses nothing
else than the autonomy of the pure practical reason； that is； freedom；
and this is itself the formal condition of all maxims； and on this
condition only can they agree with the supreme practical law。 If
therefore the matter of the volition； which can be nothing else than
the object of a desire that is connected with the law； enters into the
practical law； as the condition of its possibility； there results
heteronomy of the elective will； namely； dependence on the physical
law that we should follow some impulse or inclination。 In that case
the will does not give itself the law； but only the precept how
rationally to follow pathological law； and the maxim which； in such
a case； never contains the universally legislative form； not only
produces no obligation； but is itself opposed to the principle of a
pure practical reason and； therefore； also to the moral disposition；
even though the resulting action may be conformable to the law。
REMARK。
Hence a practical precept； which contains a material （and
therefore empirical） condition； must never be reckoned a practical
law。 For the law of the pure will； which is free； brings the will into
a sphere quite different from the empirical； and as the necessity
involved in the law is not a physical necessity； it can only consist
in the formal conditions of the possibility of a law in general。 All
the matter of practical rules rests on subjective conditions； which
give them only a conditional universality （in case I desire this or
that； what I must do in order to obtain it）； and they all turn on
the principle of private happiness。 Now； it is indeed undeniable
that every volition must have an object； and therefore a matter； but
it does not follow that this is the determining principle and the
condition of the maxim； for； if it is so； then this cannot be
exhibited in a universally legislative form； since in that case the
expectation of the existence of the object would be the determining
cause of the choice； and the volition must presuppose the dependence
of the faculty of desire on the existence of something； but this
dependence can only be sought in empirical conditions and；
therefore； can never furnish a foundation for a necessary and
universal rule。 Thus； the happiness of others may be the object of the
will of a rational being。 But if it were the determining principle
of the maxim； we must assume that we find not only a rational
satisfaction in the welfare of others； but also a want such as the
sympathetic disposition in some men occasions。 But I cannot assume the
existence of this want in every rational being （not at all in God）。
The matter； then； of the maxim may remain； but it must not be the
condition of it； else the maxim could not be fit for a law。 Hence； the
mere form of law； which limits the matter； must also be a reason for
adding this matter to the will； not for presupposing it。 For
example； let the matter be my own happiness。 This （rule）； if I
attribute it to everyone （as； in fact； I may； in the case of every
finite being）； can bee an objective practical law only if I include
the happiness of others。 Therefore； the law that we should promote the
happiness of others does not arise from the assumption that this is an
object of everyone's choice； but merely from this； that the form of
universality which reason requires as the condition of giving to a
maxim of self…love the objective validity of a law is the principle
that determines the will。 Therefore it was not the object （the
happiness of others） that determined the pure will； but it was the
form of law only； by which I restricted my maxim； founded on
inclination； so as to give it the universality of a law； and thus to
adapt it to the practical reason； and it is this restriction alone；
and not the addition of an external spring； that can give rise to
the notion of the obligation to extend the maxim of my self…love to
the happiness of others。
REMARK II。
The direct opposite of the principle of morality is； when the
principle of private happiness is made the determining principle of
the will； and with this is to be reckoned； as I have shown above；
everything that places the determining principle which is to serve
as a law； anywhere but in the legislative form of the maxim。 This
contradiction； however； is not merely logical； like that which would
arise between rules empirically conditioned； if they were raised to
the rank of necessary principles of cognition； but is practical； and
would ruin morality altogether were not the voice of reason in
reference to the will so clear； so irrepressible； so distinctly
audible； even to the monest men。 It can only； indeed； be maintained
in the perplexing speculations of the schools； which are bold enough
to shut their ears against that heavenly voice； in order to support
a theory that costs no trouble。
Suppose that an acquaintance whom you otherwise liked were to
attempt to justify himself to you for having borne false witness；
first by alleging the； in his view； sacred duty of consulting his
own happiness； then by enumerating the advantages which he had
gained thereby； pointing out the prudence he had shown in securing
himself against detection； even by yourself； to whom he now reveals
the secret； only in order that he may be able to deny it at any
time； and suppose he were then to affirm； in all seriousness； that
he has fulfilled a true human duty； you would either laugh in his
face； or shrink back from him with disgust； and yet； if a man has
regulated his principles of action solely with a view to his own
advantage； you would have nothing whatever to object against this mode
of proceeding。 Or suppose some one remends you a man as steward； as
a man to whom you can blindly trust all your affairs； and； in order to
inspire you with confidence； extols him as a prudent man who
thoroughly understands his own interest； and is so indefatigably
active that he lets slip no opportunity of advancing it； lastly；
lest you should be afraid of finding a vulgar selfishness in him；
praises the good taste with which he lives； not seeking his pleasure
in money…making； or in coarse wantonness； but in the enlargement of
his knowledge； in instructive intercourse with a select circle； and
even in relieving the needy； while as to the means （which； of
course； derive all their value from the end）； he is not particular；
and is ready to use other people's money for the purpose as if it were
his own； provided only he knows that he can do so safely； and
without discovery； you would either believe that the remender was
mocking you； or that he had lost his senses。 So sharply and clearly
marked are the boundaries of morality and self…love that even the
monest eye cannot fail to distinguish whether a thing belongs to
the one or the other。 The few remarks that follow may appear
superfluous where the truth is so plain； but at least they may serve
to give a little more distinctness to the judgement of mon sense。
The principle of happiness may； indeed； furnish maxims； but never
such as would be petent to be laws of the will； even if universal
happiness were made the object。 For since the knowledge of this
rests on mere empirical data； since every man's judgement on it
depends very much on his particular point of view； which is itself
moreover very variable； it can supply only general rules； not
universal； that is； it can give rules which on the average will most
frequently fit； but not rules which must hold good always and
necessarily； hence； no practical laws can be founded on it。 Just
because in this case an object of choice is the foundation of the rule
and must therefore precede it； the rule can refer to nothing but
what is ＇felt＇； and therefore it refers to experience and is founded
on it； and then the variety of judgement must be endless。 This
principle； therefore； does not prescribe the same practical rules to
all rational beings； although the rules are all included under a
mon title； namely； that of happiness。 The moral law； however； is
conceived as objectively necessary； only because it holds for everyone
that has reason and will。
The maxim of self…love （prudence） only advises； the law of
morality mands。 Now there is a great difference between that
which we are advised to do and that to which we are obliged。
The monest intelligence can easily and without hesitation see
what； on the principle of autonomy of the will； requires to be done；
but on supposition of heteronomy of the will； it is bard and
requires knowledge of the world to see what is to be done。 That is
to say； what duty is； is plain of itself to everyone； but what is to
bring true durable advantage； such as will extend to the whole of
one's existence； is always veiled in impenetrable obscurity； and
much prudence is required to adapt the practical rule founded on it to
the ends of life； even tolerably； by making proper exceptions。 But the
moral law mands the most punctual obedience from everyone； it must；
therefore； not be so difficult to judge what it requires to be done；
that the monest unpractised understanding； even without worldly
prudence； should fail to apply it rightly。
It is always in everyone's power to satisfy the categorical
mand of morality； whereas it is seldom possible； and by no means so
to everyone； to satisfy the empirically conditioned precept of
happiness； even with regard to a single purpose。 The reason is that in
the former case there is question only of the maxim； which must be
genuine and pure； but in the latter case there is question also of
one's capacity and physical power to realize a desired object。 A
mand that everyone should try to make himself happy would be
foolish； for one never mands anyone to do what he of himself
infallibly wishes to do。 We must only mand the means； or rather
supply them； since he cannot do everything that he wishes。 But to
mand morality under the name of duty is quite rational； for； in the
first place； not everyone is willing to obey its precepts if they
oppose his inclinations； and as to the means of obeying this law；
these need not in this case be taught； for in this respect whatever he
wishes to do be can do。
He who has lost at play may be vexed at himself and his folly； but
if he is conscious of having cheated at play （although he has gained
thereby）； he must despise himself as soon as he pares himself
with the moral law。 This must； therefore； be something different
from the principle of private happiness。 For a man must have a
different criterion when he is pelled to say to himself： 〃I am a
worthless fellow； though I have filled my purse〃； and when he approves
himself； and says： 〃I am a prudent man； for I have enriched my
treasure。〃
Finally； there is something further in the idea of our practical
reason； which acpanies the transgression of a moral law… namely；
its ill desert。 Now the notion of punishment； as such； cannot be
united with that of being a partaker of happiness； for although
he who inflicts the punishment may at the same time have the
benevolent purpose of directing this punishment to this end； yet it
must first be justified in itself as punishment； i。e。； as mere harm；
so that if it stopped there； and the person punished could get no
glimpse of kindness hidden behind this harshness； he must yet admit
that justice was done him； and that his reward was perfectly
suitable to his conduct。 In every punishment； as such； there must
first be justice； and this constitutes the essence of the notion。
Benevolence may； indeed； be united with it； but the man who has
deserved punishment has not the least reason to reckon upon this。
Punishment； then； is