按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
will is not of itself determined to maxims which could of themselves
be the foundation of a natural system of universal laws； or which
could even be adapted to a system so constituted； on the contrary； its
maxims are private inclinations which constitute； indeed； a natural
whole in conformity with pathological （physical） laws； but could not
form part of a system of nature； which would only be possible
through our will acting in accordance with pure practical laws。 Yet we
are； through reason； conscious of a law to which all our maxims are
subject； as though a natural order must be originated from our will。
This law； therefore； must be the idea of a natural system not given in
experience； and yet possible through freedom； a system； therefore；
which is supersensible； and to which we give objective reality； at
least in a practical point of view； since we look on it as an object
of our will as pure rational beings。
Hence the distinction between the laws of a natural system to
which the will is subject； and of a natural system which is subject to
a will （as far as its relation to its free actions is concerned）；
rests on this； that in the former the objects must be causes of the
ideas which determine the will； whereas in the latter the will is
the cause of the objects； so that its causality has its determining
principle solely in the pure faculty of reason； which may therefore be
called a pure practical reason。
There are therefore two very distinct problems： how； on the one
side； pure reason can cognise objects a priori； and how on the other
side it can be an immediate determining principle of the will； that
is； of the causality of the rational being with respect to the reality
of objects （through the mere thought of the universal validity of
its own maxims as laws）。
The former； which belongs to the critique of the pure speculative
reason； requires a previous explanation； how intuitions without
which no object can be given； and； therefore； none known
synthetically； are possible a priori； and its solution turns out to be
that these are all only sensible and； therefore； do not render
possible any speculative knowledge which goes further than possible
experience reaches； and that therefore all the principles of that pure
speculative reason avail only to make experience possible； either
experience of given objects or of those that may be given ad
infinitum； but never are pletely given。
The latter； which belongs to the critique of practical reason；
requires no explanation how the objects of the faculty of desire are
possible； for that being a problem of the theoretical knowledge of
nature is left to the critique of the speculative reason； but only how
reason can determine the maxims of the will； whether this takes
place only by means of empirical ideas as principles of determination；
or whether pure reason can be practical and be the law of a possible
order of nature； which is not empirically knowable。 The possibility of
such a supersensible system of nature； the conception of which can
also be the ground of its reality through our own free will； does
not require any a priori intuition （of an intelligible world） which；
being in this case supersensible； would be impossible for us。 For
the question is only as to the determining principle of volition in
its maxims； namely； whether it is empirical； or is a conception of the
pure reason （having the legal character belonging to it in general）；
and how it can be the latter。 It is left to the theoretic principles
of reason to decide whether the causality of the will suffices for the
realization of the objects or not； this being an inquiry into the
possibility of the objects of the volition。 Intuition of these objects
is therefore of no importance to the practical problem。 We are here
concerned only with the determination of the will and the
determining principles of its maxims as a free will； not at all with
the result。 For； provided only that the will conforms to the law of
pure reason； then let its power in execution be what it may； whether
according to these maxims of legislation of a possible system of
nature any such system really results or not； this is no concern of
the critique； which only inquires whether； and in what way； pure
reason can be practical； that is directly determine the will。
In this inquiry criticism may and must begin with pure practical
laws and their reality。 But instead of intuition it takes as their
foundation the conception of their existence in the intelligible
world； namely； the concept of freedom。 For this concept has no other
meaning； and these laws are only possible in relation to freedom of
the will； but freedom being supposed； they are necessary； or
conversely freedom is necessary because those laws are necessary；
being practical postulates。 It cannot be further explained how this
consciousness of the moral law； or； what is the same thing； of
freedom； is possible； but that it is admissible is well established in
the theoretical critique。
The exposition of the supreme principle of practical reason is now
finished； that is to say； it has been… shown first； what it
contains； that it subsists for itself quite a priori and independent
of empirical principles； and next in what it is distinguished from all
other practical principles。 With the deduction； that is； the
justification of its objective and universal validity； and the
discernment of the possibility of such a synthetical proposition a
priori； we cannot expect to succeed so well as in the case of the
principles of pure theoretical reason。 For these referred to objects
of possible experience； namely； to phenomena； and we could prove
that these phenomena could be known as objects of experience only by
being brought under the categories in accordance with these laws；
and consequently that all possible experience must conform to these
laws。 But I could not proceed in this way with the deduction of the
moral law。 For this does not concern the knowledge of the properties
of objects； which may be given to the reason from some other source；
but a knowledge which can itself be the ground of the existence of the
objects； and by which reason in a rational being has causality；
i。e。； pure reason； which can be regarded as a faculty immediately
determining the will。
Now all our human insight is at an end as soon as we have arrived at
fundamental powers or faculties； for the possibility of these cannot
be understood by any means； and just as little should it be
arbitrarily invented and assumed。 Therefore； in the theoretic use of
reason； it is experience alone that can justify us in assuming them。
But this expedient of adducing empirical proofs； instead of a
deduction from a priori sources of knowledge； is denied us here in
respect to the pure practical faculty of reason。 For whatever requires
to draw the proof of its reality from experience must depend for the
grounds of its possibility on principles of experience； and pure；
yet practical； reason by its very notion cannot be regarded as such。
Further； the moral law is given as a fact of pure reason of which we
are a priori conscious； and which is apodeictically certain； though it
be granted that in experience no example of its exact fulfilment can
be found。 Hence； the objective reality of the moral law cannot be
proved by any deduction by any efforts of theoretical reason；
whether speculative or empirically supported； and therefore； even if
we renounced its apodeictic certainty； it could not be proved a
posteriori by experience； and yet it is firmly established of itself。
But instead of this vainly sought deduction of the moral
principle； something else is found which was quite unexpected； namely；
that this moral principle serves conversely as the principle of the
deduction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience could prove；
but of which speculative reason was pelled at least to assume the
possibility （in order to find amongst its cosmological ideas the
unconditioned in the chain of causality； so as not to contradict
itself）… I mean the faculty of freedom。 The moral law； which itself
does not require a justification； proves not merely the possibility of
freedom； but that it really belongs to beings who recognize this law
as binding on themselves。 The moral law is in fact a law of the
causality of free agents and； therefore； of the possibility of a
supersensible system of nature； just as the metaphysical law of events
in the world of sense was a law of causality of the sensible system of
nature； and it therefore determines what speculative philosophy was
pelled to leave undetermined； namely； the law for a causality；
the concept of which in the latter was only negative； and therefore
for the first time gives this concept objective reality。
This sort of credential of the moral law； viz。； that it is set forth
as a principle of the deduction of freedom； which is a causality of
pure reason； is a sufficient substitute for all a priori
justification； since theoretic reason was pelled to assume at least
the possibility of freedom； in order to satisfy a want of its own。 For
the moral law proves its reality； so as even to satisfy the critique
of the speculative reason； by the fact that it adds a positive
definition to a causality previously conceived only negatively； the
possibility of which was inprehensible to speculative reason； which
yet was pelled to suppose it。 For it adds the notion of a reason
that directly determines the will （by imposing on its maxims the
condition of a universal legislative form）； and thus it is able for
the first time to give objective； though only practical； reality to
reason； which always became transcendent when it sought to proceed
speculatively with its ideas。 It thus changes the transcendent use
of reason into an immanent use （so that reason is itself； by means
of ideas； an efficient cause in the field of experience）。
The determination of the causality of beings in the world of
sense； as such； can never be unconditioned； and yet for every series
of conditions there must be something unconditioned； and therefore
there must be a causality which is determined wholly by itself。 Hence；
the idea of freedom as a faculty of absolute spontaneity was not found
to be a want but； as far as its possibility is concerned； an
analytic principle of pure speculative reason。 But as it is absolutely
impossible to find in experience any example in accordance with this
idea； because amongst the causes of things as phenomena it would be
impossible to meet with any absolutely unconditioned determination
of causality； we were only able to defend our supposition that a
freely acting cause might be a being in the world of sense； in so
far as it is considered in the other point of view as a noumenon；
showing that there is no contradiction in regarding all its actions as
subject to physical conditions so far as they are phenomena； and yet
regarding its causality as physically unconditioned； in so far as
the acting being belongs to the world of understanding； and in thus
making the concept of freedom the regulative principle of reason。 By
this principle I do not indeed learn what the object is to which
that sort of causality is attributed； but I remove the difficulty；
for； on the one side； in the explanation of events in the world； and
consequently also of the actions of rational beings； I leave to the
mechanism of physical necessity the right of ascending from
conditioned to condition ad infinitum； while on the other side I
keep open for speculative reason the place which for it is vacant；
namely； the intelligible； in order to transfer the unconditioned
thither。 But I was not able to verify this supposition； that is； to
change it into the knowledge of a being so acting； not even into the
knowledge of the possibility of such a being。 This vacant place is now
filled by pure practical reason with a definite law of causality in an
intelligible world （causality with freedom）； namely； the moral law。
Speculative reason does not hereby gain anything as regards its
insight； but only as regards the certainty of its problematical notion
of freedom； which here obtains objective reality； which； though only
practical； is nevertheless undoubted。 Even the notion of causality…
the application； and consequently the signification； of which holds
properly only in relation to phenomena； so as to connect them into
experiences （as is shown by the Critique of Pure Reason）… is not so
enlarged as to extend its use beyond these limits。 For if reason
sought to do this； it would have to show how the logical relation of
principle and consequence can be used synthetically in a different
sort of intuition from the sensible； that is how a causa noumenon is
possible。 This it can never do； and； as practical reason； it does
not even concern itself with it； since it only places the
determining principle of causality of man as a sensible creature
（which is given） in pure reason （which is therefore called practical）；
and therefore it employs the notion of cause； not in order to know
objects； but to determine causality in relation to objects in general。
It can abstract altogether from the application of this notion to
object