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supersensible order and connection； which； however； for this very
reason cannot be extended further than is necessary for pure practical
purposes。
Let me be permitted on this occasion to make one more remark；
namely； that every step that we make with pure reason； even in the
practical sphere where no attention is paid to subtle speculation；
nevertheless accords with all the material points of the Critique of
the Theoretical Reason as closely and directly as if each step had
been thought out with deliberate purpose to establish this
confirmation。 Such a thorough agreement； wholly unsought for and quite
obvious （as anyone can convince himself； if he will only carry moral
inquiries up to their principles）； between the most important
proposition of practical reason and the often seemingly too subtle and
needless remarks of the Critique of the Speculative Reason；
occasions surprise and astonishment； and confirms the maxim already
recognized and praised by others； namely； that in every scientific
inquiry we should pursue our way steadily with all possible
exactness and frankness； without caring for any objections that may be
raised from outside its sphere； but； as far as we can； to carry out
our inquiry truthfully and pletely by itself。 Frequent
observation has convinced me that； when such researches are concluded；
that which in one part of them appeared to me very questionable；
considered in relation to other extraneous doctrines； when I left this
doubtfulness out of sight for a time and only attended to the business
in hand until it was pleted； at last was unexpectedly found to
agree perfectly with what had been discovered separately without the
least regard to those doctrines； and without any partiality or
prejudice for them。 Authors would save themselves many errors and much
labour lost （because spent on a delusion） if they could only resolve
to go to work with more frankness。
BOOK II。 Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason。
CHAPTER I。 Of a Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason Generally。
Pure reason always has its dialetic； whether it is considered in its
speculative or its practical employment； for it requires the
absolute totality of the 'conditions of what is given conditioned； and
this can only be found in things in themselves。 But as all conceptions
of things in themselves must be referred to intuitions； and with us
men these can never be other than sensible and hence can never
enable us to know objects as things in themselves but only as
appearances； and since the unconditioned can never be found in this
chain of appearances which consists only of conditioned and
conditions； thus from applying this rational idea of the totality of
the conditions （in other words of the unconditioned） to appearances；
there arises an inevitable illusion； as if these latter were things in
themselves （for in the absence of a warning critique they are always
regarded as such）。 This illusion would never be noticed as delusive if
it did not betray itself by a conflict of reason with itself； when
it applies to appearances its fundamental principle of presupposing
the unconditioned to everything conditioned。 By this； however；
reason is pelled to trace this illusion to its source； and search
how it can be removed； and this can only be done by a plete
critical examination of the whole pure faculty of reason； so that
the antinomy of the pure reason which is manifest in its dialectic
is in fact the most beneficial error into which human reason could
ever have fallen； since it at last drives us to search for the key
to escape from this labyrinth； and when this key is found； it
further discovers that which we did not seek but yet had need of；
namely； a view into a higher and an immutable order of things； in
which we even now are； and in which we are thereby enabled by definite
precepts to continue to live according to the highest dictates of
reason。
It may be seen in detail in the Critique of Pure Reason how in its
speculative employment this natural dialectic is to be solved； and how
the error which arises from a very natural illusion may be guarded
against。 But reason in its practical use is not a whit better off。
As pure practical reason； it likewise seeks to find the
unconditioned for the practically conditioned （which rests on
inclinations and natural wants）； and this is not as the determining
principle of the will； but even when this is given （in the moral
law） it seeks the unconditioned totality of the object of pure
practical reason under the name of the summum bonum。
To define this idea practically； i。e。； sufficiently for the maxims
of our rational conduct； is the business of practical wisdom； and this
again as a science is philosophy； in the sense in which the word was
understood by the ancients； with whom it meant instruction in the
conception in which the summum bonum was to be placed； and the conduct
by which it was to be obtained。 It would be well to leave this word in
its ancient signification as a doctrine of the summum bonum； so far as
reason endeavours to make this into a science。 For on the one band the
restriction annexed would suit the Greek expression （which signifies
the love of wisdom）； and yet at the same time would be sufficient to
embrace under the name of philosophy the love of science： that is to
say； of all speculative rational knowledge； so far as it is
serviceable to reason； both for that conception and also for the
practical principle determining our conduct； without letting out of
sight the main end； on account of which alone it can be called a
doctrine of practical wisdom。 On the other hand； it would be no harm
to deter the self…conceit of one who ventures to claim the title of
philosopher by holding before him in the very definition a standard of
self…estimation which would very much lower his pretensions。 For a
teacher of wisdom would mean something more than a scholar who has not
e so far as to guide himself； much less to guide others； with
certain expectation of attaining so high an end： it would mean a
master in the knowledge of wisdom； which implies more than a modest
man would claim for himself。 Thus philosophy as well as wisdom would
always remain an ideal； which objectively is presented plete in
reason alone； while subjectively for the person it is only the goal of
his unceasing endeavours； and no one would be justified in
professing to be in possession of it so as to assume the name of
philosopher who could not also show its infallible effects in his
own person as an example （in his self…mastery and the unquestioned
interest that he takes pre…eminently in the general good）； and this
the ancients also required as a condition of deserving that honourable
title。
We have another preliminary remark to make respecting the
dialectic of the pure practical reason； on the point of the definition
of the summum bonum （a successful solution of which dialectic would
lead us to expect； as in case of that of the theoretical reason； the
most beneficial effects； inasmuch as the self…contradictions of pure
practical reason honestly stated； and not concealed； force us to
undertake a plete critique of this faculty）。
The moral law is the sole determining principle of a pure will。
But since this is merely formal （viz。； as prescribing only the form of
the maxim as universally legislative）； it abstracts as a determining
principle from all matter that is to say； from every object of
volition。 Hence； though the summum bonum may be the whole object of
a pure practical reason； i。e。； a pure will； yet it is not on that
account to be regarded as its determining principle； and the moral law
alone must be regarded as the principle on which that and its
realization or promotion are aimed at。 This remark is important in
so delicate a case as the determination of moral principles； where the
slightest misinterpretation perverts men's minds。 For it will have
been seen from the Analytic that； if we assume any object under the
name of a good as a determining principle of the will prior to the
moral law and then deduce from it the supreme practical principle；
this would always introduce heteronomy and crush out the moral
principle。
It is； however； evident that if the notion of the summum bonum
includes that of the moral law as its supreme condition； then the
summum bonum would not merely be an object； but the notion of it and
the conception of its existence as possible by our own practical
reason would likewise be the determining principle of the will；
since in that case the will is in fact determined by the moral law
which is already included in this conception； and by no other
object； as the principle of autonomy requires。 This order of the
conceptions of determination of the will must not be lost sight of； as
otherwise we should misunderstand ourselves and think we had fallen
into a contradiction； while everything remains in perfect harmony。
CHAPTER II。 Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in defining the
Conception of the 〃Summum Bonum〃。
The conception of the summum itself contains an ambiguity which
might occasion needless disputes if we did not attend to it。 The
summum may mean either the supreme （supremum） or the perfect
（consummatum）。 The former is that condition which is itself
unconditioned； i。e。； is not subordinate to any other （originarium）；
the second is that whole which is not a part of a greater whole of the
same kind （perfectissimum）。 It has been shown in the Analytic that
virtue （as worthiness to be happy） is the supreme condition of all
that can appear to us desirable； and consequently of all our pursuit
of happiness； and is therefore the supreme good。 But it does not
follow that it is the whole and perfect good as the object of the
desires of rational finite beings； for this requires happiness also；
and that not merely in the partial eyes of the person who makes
himself an end； but even in the judgement of an impartial reason；
which regards persons in general as ends in themselves。 For to need
happiness； to deserve it； and yet at the same time not to
participate in it； cannot be consistent with the perfect volition of a
rational being possessed at the same time of all power； if； for the
sake of experiment； we conceive such a being。 Now inasmuch as virtue
and happiness together constitute the possession of the summum bonum
in a person； and the distribution of happiness in exact proportion
to morality （which is the worth of the person； and his worthiness to
be happy） constitutes the summum bonum of a possible world； hence this
summum bonum expresses the whole； the perfect good； in which； however；
virtue as the condition is always the supreme good； since it has no
condition above it； whereas happiness； while it is pleasant to the
possessor of it； is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good；
but always presupposes morally right behaviour as its condition。
When two elements are necessarily united in one concept； they must
be connected as reason and consequence； and this either so that
their unity is considered as analytical （logical connection）； or as
synthetical （real connection） the former following the law of
identity； the latter that of causality。 The connection of virtue and
happiness may therefore be understood in two ways： either the
endeavour to be virtuous and the rational pursuit of happiness are not
two distinct actions； but absolutely identical； in which case no maxim
need be made the principle of the former； other than what serves for
the latter； or the connection consists in this； that virtue produces
happiness as something distinct from the consciousness of virtue； as a
cause produces an effect。
The ancient Greek schools were； properly speaking； only two； and
in determining the conception of the summum bonum these followed in
fact one and the same method； inasmuch as they did not allow virtue
and happiness to be regarded as two distinct elements of the summum
bonum； and consequently sought the unity of the principle by the
rule of identity； but they differed as to which of the two was to be
taken as the fundamental notion。 The Epicurean said： 〃To be
conscious that one's maxims lead to happiness is virtue〃； the Stoic
said： 〃To be conscious of one's virtue is happiness。〃 With the former；
Prudence was equivalent to morality； with the latter； who chose a
higher designation for virtue； morality alone was true wisdom。
While we must admire the men who in such early times tried all
imaginable ways of extending the domain of philosophy； we must at
the same time lament that their acuteness was unfortunately misapplied
in trying to trace out identity between two extremely heterogeneous
notions； those of happiness and virtue。 But it agrees with the
dialectical spirit of their times （and subtle minds are even now
sometimes misled in the same way） to get rid of irreconcilable
differences in principle by seeking to change them into a mere contest
about words； and thus apparently working out the identity of the
notion under different names； and this usually occurs in cases where
the bination of heterogeneous principles lies so deep or so high；
or would require so plete a transformation of the doctrines assumed
in t