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supersensible subject can be free with respect to a given action；
although； as a subject also belonging to the world of sense； he is
under mechanical conditions with respect to the same action； still； as
soon as we allow that God as universal first cause is also the cause
of the existence of substance （a proposition which can never be
given up without at the same time giving up the notion of God as the
Being of all beings； and therewith giving up his all sufficiency； on
which everything in theology depends）； it seems as if we must admit
that a man's actions have their determining principle in something
which is wholly out of his power… namely； in the causality of a
Supreme Being distinct from himself and on whom his own existence
and the whole determination of his causality are absolutely dependent。
In point of fact； if a man's actions as belonging to his modifications
in time were not merely modifications of him as appearance； but as a
thing in itself； freedom could not be saved。 Man would be a marionette
or an automaton； like Vaucanson's； prepared and wound up by the
Supreme Artist。 Self…consciousness would indeed make him a thinking
automaton； but the consciousness of his own spontaneity would be
mere delusion if this were mistaken for freedom； and it would
deserve this name only in a parative sense； since； although the
proximate determining causes of its motion and a long series of
their determining causes are internal； yet the last and highest is
found in a foreign hand。 Therefore I do not see how those who still
insist on regarding time and space as attributes belonging to the
existence of things in themselves； can avoid admitting the fatality of
actions； or if （like the otherwise acute Mendelssohn） they allow
them to be conditions necessarily belonging to the existence of finite
and derived beings； but not to that of the infinite Supreme Being； I
do not see on what ground they can justify such a distinction； or；
indeed； how they can avoid the contradiction that meets them； when
they hold that existence in time is an attribute necessarily belonging
to finite things in themselves； whereas God is the cause of this
existence； but cannot be the cause of time （or space） itself （since
this must be presupposed as a necessary a priori condition of the
existence of things）； and consequently as regards the existence of
these things。 His causality must be subject to conditions and even
to the condition of time； and this would inevitably bring in
everything contradictory to the notions of His infinity and
independence。 On the other hand； it is quite easy for us to draw the
distinction between the attribute of the divine existence of being
independent on all time…conditions； and that of a being of the world
of sense； the distinction being that between the existence of a
being in itself and that of a thing in appearance。 Hence； if this
ideality of time and space is not adopted； nothing remains but
Spinozism； in which space and time are essential attributes of the
Supreme Being Himself； and the things dependent on Him （ourselves；
therefore； included） are not substances； but merely accidents inhering
in Him； since； if these things as His effects exist in time only； this
being the condition of their existence in themselves； then the actions
of these beings must be simply His actions which He performs in some
place and time。 Thus； Spinozism； in spite of the absurdity of its
fundamental idea； argues more consistently than the creation theory
can； when beings assumed to be substances； and beings in themselves
existing in time； are regarded as effects of a Supreme Cause； and
yet as not ＇belonging＇ to Him and His action； but as separate
substances。
The above…mentioned difficulty is resolved briefly and clearly as
follows： If existence in time is a mere sensible mode of
representation belonging to thinking beings in the world and
consequently does not apply to them as things in themselves； then
the creation of these beings is a creation of things in themselves；
since the notion of creation does not belong to the sensible form of
representation of existence or to causality； but can only be
referred to noumena。 Consequently； when I say of beings in the world
of sense that they are created； I so far regard them as noumena。 As it
would be a contradiction； therefore； to say that God is a creator of
appearances； so also it is a contradiction to say that as creator He
is the cause of actions in the world of sense； and therefore as
appearances； although He is the cause of the existence of the acting
beings （which are noumena）。 If now it is possible to affirm freedom in
spite of the natural mechanism of actions as appearances （by regarding
existence in time as something that belongs only to appearances； not
to things in themselves）； then the circumstance that the acting beings
are creatures cannot make the slightest difference； since creation
concerns their supersensible and not their sensible existence； and；
therefore； cannot be regarded as the determining principle of the
appearances。 It would be quite different if the beings in the world as
things in themselves existed in time； since in that case the creator
of substance would be at the same time the author of the whole
mechanism of this substance。
Of so great importance is the separation of time （as well as
space） from the existence of things in themselves which was effected
in the Critique of the Pure Speculative Reason。
It may be said that the solution here proposed involves great
difficulty in itself and is scarcely susceptible of a lucid
exposition。 But is any other solution that has been attempted； or that
may be attempted； easier and more intelligible？ Rather might we say
that the dogmatic teachers of metaphysics have shown more shrewdness
than candour in keeping this difficult point out of sight as much as
possible； in the hope that if they said nothing about it； probably
no one would think of it。 If science is to be advanced； all
difficulties must be laid open； and we must even search for those that
are hidden； for every difficulty calls forth a remedy； which cannot be
discovered without science gaining either in extent or in exactness；
and thus even obstacles bee means of increasing the thoroughness of
science。 On the other hand； if the difficulties are intentionally
concealed； or merely removed by palliatives； then sooner or later they
burst out into incurable mischiefs； which bring science to ruin in
an absolute scepticism。
Since it is； properly speaking； the notion of freedom alone
amongst all the ideas of pure speculative reason that so greatly
enlarges our knowledge in the sphere of the supersensible； though only
of our practical knowledge； I ask myself why it exclusively
possesses so great fertility； whereas the others only designate the
vacant space for possible beings of the pure understanding； but are
unable by any means to define the concept of them。 I presently find
that as I cannot think anything without a category； I must first
look for a category for the rational idea of freedom with which I am
now concerned； and this is the category of causality； and although
freedom； a concept of the reason； being a transcendent concept； cannot
have any intuition corresponding to it； yet the concept of the
understanding… for the synthesis of which the former demands the
unconditioned… （namely； the concept of causality） must have a sensible
intuition given； by which first its objective reality is assured。 Now；
the categories are all divided into two classes… the mathematical；
which concern the unity of synthesis in the conception of objects； and
the dynamical； which refer to the unity of synthesis in the conception
of the existence of objects。 The former （those of magnitude and
quality） always contain a synthesis of the homogeneous； and it is
not possible to find in this the unconditioned antecedent to what is
given in sensible intuition as conditioned in space and time； as
this would itself have to belong to space and time； and therefore be
again still conditioned。 Whence it resulted in the Dialectic of Pure
Theoretic Reason that the opposite methods of attaining the
unconditioned and the totality of the conditions were both wrong。
The categories of the second class （those of causality and of the
necessity of a thing） did not require this homogeneity （of the
conditioned and the condition in synthesis）； since here what we have
to explain is not how the intuition is pounded from a manifold in
it； but only how the existence of the conditioned object corresponding
to it is added to the existence of the condition （added； namely； in
the understanding as connected therewith）； and in that case it was
allowable to suppose in the supersensible world the unconditioned
antecedent to the altogether conditioned in the world of sense （both
as regards the causal connection and the contingent existence of
things themselves）； although this unconditioned remained
indeterminate； and to make the synthesis transcendent。 Hence； it was
found in the Dialectic of the Pure Speculative Reason that the two
apparently opposite methods of obtaining for the conditioned the
unconditioned were not really contradictory； e。g。； in the synthesis of
causality to conceive for the conditioned in the series of causes
and effects of the sensible world； a causality which has no sensible
condition； and that the same action which； as belonging to the world
of sense； is always sensibly conditioned； that is； mechanically
necessary； yet at the same time may be derived from a causality not
sensibly conditioned… being the causality of the acting being as
belonging to the supersensible world… and may consequently be
conceived as free。 Now； the only point in question was to change
this may be into is； that is； that we should be able to show in an
actual case； as it were by a fact； that certain actions imply such a
causality （namely； the intellectual； sensibly unconditioned）；
whether they are actual or only manded； that is； objectively
necessary in a practical sense。 We could not hope to find this
connections in actions actually given in experience as events of the
sensible world； since causality with freedom must always be sought
outside the world of sense in the world of intelligence。 But things of
sense of sense in the world of intelligence。 But things of sense are
the only things offered to our perception and observation。 Hence；
nothing remained but to find an incontestable objective principle of
causality which excludes all sensible conditions： that is； a principle
in which reason does not appeal further to something else as a
determining ground of its causality； but contains this determining
ground itself by means of that principle； and in which therefore it is
itself as pure reason practical。 Now； this principle had not to be
searched for or discovered； it had long been in the reason of all men；
and incorporated in their nature； and is the principle of morality。
Therefore； that unconditioned causality； with the faculty of it；
namely； freedom； is no longer merely indefinitely and
problematically thought （this speculative reason could prove to be
feasible）； but is even as regards the law of its causality
definitely and assertorially known； and with it the fact that a
being （I myself）； belonging to the world of sense； belongs also to the
supersensible world； this is also positively known； and thus the
reality of the supersensible world is established and in practical
respects definitely given； and this definiteness； which for
theoretical purposes would be transcendent； is for practical
purposes immanent。 We could not； however； make a similar step as
regards the second dynamical idea； namely； that of a necessary
being。 We could not rise to it from the sensible world without the aid
of the first dynamical idea。 For if we attempted to do so； we should
have ventured to leave at a bound all that is given to us； and to leap
to that of which nothing is given us that can help us to effect the
connection of such a supersensible being with the world of sense
（since the necessary being would have to be known as given outside
ourselves）。 On the other hand； it is now obvious that this
connection is quite possible in relation to our own subject；
inasmuch as I know myself to be on the one side as an intelligible
＇supersensible＇ being determined by the moral law （by means of
freedom）； and on the other side as acting in the world of sense。 It is
the concept of freedom alone that enables us to find the unconditioned
and intelligible for the conditioned and sensible without going out of
ourselves。 For it is our own reason that by means of the supreme and
unconditional practical law knows that itself and the being that is
conscious of this law （our own person） belong to the pure world of
understanding； and moreover defines the manner in which； as such； it
can be active。 In this way it can be understood why in the whole
faculty of reason it is the practical reason only that can help us
to pass beyond the world of sense and give us knowledge of a
supersensible order and connection； which； however； for this very
reason cannot be extended further than is necessary for pure practical
pur