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parte priori； which I only continue according to a pre…determined
order and could never begin of myself； would be a continuous
physical chain； and therefore my causality would never be freedom。
If； then； we would attribute freedom to a being whose existence is
determined in time； we cannot except him from the law of necessity
as to all events in his existence and； consequently； as to his actions
also； for that would be to hand him over to blind chance。 Now as
this law inevitably applies to all the causality of things； so far
as their existence is determinable in time； it follows that if this
were the mode in which we had also to conceive the existence of
these things in themselves； freedom must be rejected as a vain and
impossible conception。 Consequently； if we would still save it； no
other way remains but to consider that the existence of a thing； so
far as it is determinable in time； and therefore its causality；
according to the law of physical necessity； belong to appearance；
and to attribute freedom to the same being as a thing in itself。
This is certainly inevitable； if we would retain both these
contradictory concepts together； but in application； when we try to
explain their bination in one and the same action； great
difficulties present themselves which seem to render such a
bination impracticable。
When I say of a man who mits a theft that； by the law of
causality； this deed is a necessary result of the determining causes
in preceding time； then it was impossible that it could not have
happened； how then can the judgement； according to the moral law； make
any change； and suppose that it could have been omitted； because the
law says that it ought to have been omitted； that is； how can a man be
called quite free at the same moment； and with respect to the same
action in which he is subject to an inevitable physical necessity？
Some try to evade this by saying that the causes that determine his
causality are of such a kind as to agree with a parative notion
of freedom。 According to this； that is sometimes called a free effect；
the determining physical cause of which lies within the acting thing
itself； e。g。； that which a projectile performs when it is in free
motion； in which case we use the word freedom； because while it is
in flight it is not urged by anything external； or as we call the
motion of a clock a free motion； because it moves its hands itself；
which therefore do not require to be pushed by external force； so
although the actions of man are necessarily determined by causes which
precede in time； we yet call them free； because these causes are ideas
produced by our own faculties； whereby desires are evoked on
occasion of circumstances； and hence actions are wrought according
to our own pleasure。 This is a wretched subterfuge with which some
persons still let themselves be put off； and so think they have
solved； with a petty word… jugglery； that difficult problem； at the
solution of which centuries have laboured in vain； and which can
therefore scarcely be found so pletely on the surface。 In fact；
in the question about the freedom which must be the foundation of
all moral laws and the consequent responsibility； it does not matter
whether the principles which necessarily determine causality by a
physical law reside within the subject or without him； or in the
former case whether these principles are instinctive or are
conceived by reason； if； as is admitted by these men themselves； these
determining ideas have the ground of their existence in time and in
the antecedent state； and this again in an antecedent； etc。 Then it
matters not that these are internal； it matters not that they have a
psychological and not a mechanical causality； that is； produce actions
by means of ideas and not by bodily movements； they are still
determining principles of the causality of a being whose existence
is determinable in time； and therefore under the necessitation of
conditions of past time； which therefore； when the subject has to act；
are no longer in his power。 This may imply psychological freedom （if
we choose to apply this term to a merely internal chain of ideas in
the mind）； but it involves physical necessity and； therefore； leaves
no room for transcendental freedom； which must be conceived as
independence on everything empirical； and； consequently； on nature
generally； whether it is an object of the internal sense considered in
time only； or of the external in time and space。 Without this
freedom （in the latter and true sense）； which alone is practical a
priori； no moral law and no moral imputation are possible。 just for
this reason the necessity of events in time； according to the physical
law of causality； may be called the mechanism of nature； although we
do not mean by this that things which are subject to it must be really
material machines。 We look here only to the necessity of the
connection of events in a time…series as it is developed according
to the physical law； whether the subject in which this development
takes place is called automaton materiale when the mechanical being is
moved by matter； or with Leibnitz spirituale when it is impelled by
ideas； and if the freedom of our will were no other than the latter
（say the psychological and parative； not also transcendental；
that is； absolute）； then it would at bottom be nothing better than the
freedom of a turnspit； which； when once it is wound up； acplishes
its motions of itself。
Now； in order to remove in the supposed case the apparent
contradiction between freedom and the mechanism of nature in one and
the same action； we must remember what was said in the Critique of
Pure Reason； or what follows therefrom； viz。； that the necessity of
nature； which cannot co…exist with the freedom of the subject；
appertains only to the attributes of the thing that is subject to
time…conditions； consequently only to those of the acting subject as a
phenomenon； that therefore in this respect the determining
principles of every action of the same reside in what belongs to
past time and is no longer in his power （in which must be included his
own past actions and the character that these may determine for him in
his own eyes as a phenomenon）。 But the very same subject； being on the
other side conscious of himself as a thing in himself； considers his
existence also in so far as it is not subject to time…conditions；
and regards himself as only determinable by laws which he gives
himself through reason； and in this his existence nothing is
antecedent to the determination of his will； but every action； and
in general every modification of his existence； varying according to
his internal sense； even the whole series of his existence as a
sensible being is in the consciousness of his supersensible
existence nothing but the result； and never to be regarded as the
determining principle； of his causality as a noumenon。 In this view
now the rational being can justly say of every unlawful action that he
performs； that he could very well have left it undone； although as
appearance it is sufficiently determined in the past； and in this
respect is absolutely necessary； for it； with all the past which
determines it； belongs to the one single phenomenon of his character
which he makes for himself； in consequence of which he imputes the
causality of those appearances to himself as a cause independent of
sensibility。
With this agree perfectly the judicial sentences of that wonderful
faculty in us which we call conscience。 A man may use as much art as
he likes in order to paint to himself an unlawful act； that he
remembers； as an unintentional error； a mere oversight； such as one
can never altogether avoid； and therefore as something in which he was
carried away by the stream of physical necessity； and thus to make
himself out innocent； yet he finds that the advocate who speaks in his
favour can by no means silence the accuser within； if only he is
conscious that at the time when he did this wrong he was in his
senses； that is； in possession of his freedom； and； nevertheless； he
accounts for his error from some bad habits； which by gradual
neglect of attention he has allowed to grow upon him to such a
degree that he can regard his error as its natural consequence；
although this cannot protect him from the blame and reproach which
he casts upon himself。 This is also the ground of repentance for a
long past action at every recollection of it； a painful feeling
produced by the moral sentiment； and which is practically void in so
far as it cannot serve to undo what has been done。 （Hence Priestley；
as a true and consistent fatalist； declares it absurd； and he deserves
to be mended for this candour more than those who； while they
maintain the mechanism of the will in fact； and its freedom in words
only； yet wish it to be thought that they include it in their system
of promise； although they do not explain the possibility of such
moral imputation。） But the pain is quite legitimate； because when
the law of our intelligible ＇supersensible＇ existence （the moral
law） is in question； reason recognizes no distinction of time； and
only asks whether the event belongs to me； as my act； and then
always morally connects the same feeling with it； whether it has
happened just now or long ago。 For in reference to the supersensible
consciousness of its existence （i。e。； freedom） the life of sense is
but a single phenomenon； which； inasmuch as it contains merely
manifestations of the mental disposition with regard to the moral
law （i。e。； of the character）； must be judged not according to the
physical necessity that belongs to it as phenomenon； but according
to the absolute spontaneity of freedom。 It may therefore be admitted
that； if it were possible to have so profound an insight into a
man's mental character as shown by internal as well as external
actions as to know all its motives； even the smallest； and likewise
all the external occasions that can influence them； we could calculate
a man's conduct for the future with as great certainty as a lunar or
solar eclipse； and nevertheless we may maintain that the man is
free。 In fact； if we were capable of a further glance； namely； an
intellectual intuition of the same subject （which indeed is not
granted to us； and instead of it we have only the rational concept）；
then we should perceive that this whole chain of appearances in regard
to all that concerns the moral laws depends on the spontaneity of
the subject as a thing in itself； of the determination of which no
physical explanation can be given。 In default of this intuition； the
moral law assures us of this distinction between the relation of our
actions as appearance to our sensible nature； and the relation of this
sensible nature to the supersensible substratum in us。 In this view；
which is natural to our reason； though inexplicable； we can also
justify some judgements which we passed with all conscientiousness；
and which yet at first sight seem quite opposed to all equity。 There
are cases in which men； even with the same education which has been
profitable to others； yet show such early depravity； and so continue
to progress in it to years of manhood； that they are thought to be
born villains； and their character altogether incapable of
improvement； and nevertheless they are judged for what they do or
leave undone； they are reproached for their faults as guilty； nay；
they themselves （the children） regard these reproaches as well
founded； exactly as if in spite of the hopeless natural quality of
mind ascribed to them； they remained just as responsible as any
other man。 This could not happen if we did not suppose that whatever
springs from a man's choice （as every action intentionally performed
undoubtedly does） has as its foundation a free causality； which from
early youth expresses its character in its manifestations （i。e。；
actions）。 These； on account of the uniformity of conduct； exhibit a
natural connection； which however does not make the vicious quality of
the will necessary； but on the contrary； is the consequence of the
evil principles voluntarily adopted and unchangeable； which only
make it so much the more culpable and deserving of punishment。 There
still remains a difficulty in the bination of freedom with the
mechanism of nature in a being belonging to the world of sense； a
difficulty which； even after all the foregoing is admitted；
threatens freedom with plete destruction。 But with this danger
there is also a circumstance that offers hope of an issue still
favourable to freedom； namely； that the same difficulty presses much
more strongly （in fact as we shall presently see； presses only） on the
system that holds the existence determinable in time and space to be
the existence of things in themselves； it does not therefore oblige us
to give up our capital supposition of the ideality of time as a mere
form of sensible intuition； and consequently as a mere manner of
representation which is proper to the subject as belonging to the
world of sense； and therefore it only requires that this view be
reconciled with this idea。
The difficulty is as follows： Even if it is admitted that the
supersensible subject can be free with respect to a g