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or would require so plete a transformation of the doctrines assumed
in the rest of the philosophical system； that men are afraid to
penetrate deeply into the real difference and prefer treating it as
a difference in questions of form。
While both schools sought to trace out the identity of the practical
principles of virtue and happiness； they were not agreed as to the way
in which they tried to force this identity； but were separated
infinitely from one another； the one placing its principle on the side
of sense； the other on that of reason； the one in the consciousness of
sensible wants； the other in the independence of practical reason on
all sensible grounds of determination。 According to the Epicurean； the
notion of virtue was already involved in the maxim： 〃To promote
one's own happiness〃； according to the Stoics； on the other hand；
the feeling of happiness was already contained in the consciousness of
virtue。 Now whatever is contained in another notion is identical
with part of the containing notion； but not with the whole； and
moreover two wholes may be specifically distinct； although they
consist of the same parts； namely if the parts are united into a whole
in totally different ways。 The Stoic maintained that the virtue was
the whole summum bonum； and happiness only the consciousness of
possessing it； as making part of the state of the subject。 The
Epicurean maintained that happiness was the whole summum bonum； and
virtue only the form of the maxim for its pursuit； viz。； the
rational use of the means for attaining it。
Now it is clear from the Analytic that the maxims of virtue and
those of private happiness are quite heterogeneous as to their supreme
practical principle； and； although they belong to one summum bonum
which together they make possible； yet they are so far from coinciding
that they restrict and check one another very much in the same
subject。 Thus the question： 〃How is the summum bonum practically
possible？〃 still remains an unsolved problem； notwithstanding all
the attempts at coalition that have hitherto been made。 The Analytic
has； however； shown what it is that makes the problem difficult to
solve； namely； that happiness and morality are two specifically
distinct elements of the summum bonum and； therefore； their
bination cannot be analytically cognised （as if the man that
seeks his own happiness should find by mere analysis of his conception
that in so acting he is virtuous； or as if the man that follows virtue
should in the consciousness of such conduct find that he is already
happy ipso facto）； but must be a synthesis of concepts。 Now since this
bination is recognised as a priori； and therefore as practically
necessary； and consequently not as derived from experience； so that
the possibility of the summum bonum does not rest on any empirical
principle； it follows that the deduction ＇legitimation＇ of this
concept must be transcendental。 It is a priori （morally） necessary
to produce the summum bonum by freedom of will： therefore the
condition of its possibility must rest solely on a priori principles
of cognition。
I。 The Antinomy of Practical Reason。
In the summum bonum which is practical for us； i。e。； to be
realized by our will； virtue and happiness are thought as
necessarily bined； so that the one cannot be assumed by pure
practical reason without the other also being attached to it。 Now this
bination （like every other） is either analytical or synthetical。 It
bas been shown that it cannot be analytical； it must then be
synthetical and； more particularly； must be conceived as the
connection of cause and effect； since it concerns a practical good；
i。e。； one that is possible by means of action； consequently either the
desire of happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue； or the
maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness。 The first is
absolutely impossible； because （as was proved in the Analytic）
maxims which place the determining principle of the will in the desire
of personal happiness are not moral at all； and no virtue can be
founded on them。 But the second is also impossible； because the
practical connection of causes and effects in the world； as the result
of the determination of the will； does not depend upon the moral
dispositions of the will； but on the knowledge of the laws of nature
and the physical power to use them for one's purposes； consequently we
cannot expect in the world by the most punctilious observance of the
moral laws any necessary connection of happiness with virtue
adequate to the summum bonum。 Now； as the promotion of this summum
bonum； the conception of which contains this connection； is a priori a
necessary object of our will and inseparably attached to the moral
law； the impossibility of the former must prove the falsity of the
latter。 If then the supreme good is not possible by practical rules；
then the moral law also which mands us to promote it is directed to
vain imaginary ends and must consequently be false。
II。 Critical Solution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason。
The antinomy of pure speculative reason exhibits a similar
conflict between freedom and physical necessity in the causality of
events in the world。 It was solved by showing that there is no real
contradiction when the events and even the world in which they occur
are regarded （as they ought to be） merely as appearances； since one
and the same acting being； as an appearance （even to his own inner
sense）； has a causality in the world of sense that always conforms
to the mechanism of nature； but with respect to the same events； so
far as the acting person regards himself at the same time as a
noumenon （as pure intelligence in an existence not dependent on the
condition of time）； he can contain a principle by which that causality
acting according to laws of nature is determined； but which is
itself free from all laws of nature。
It is just the same with the foregoing antinomy of pure practical
reason。 The first of the two propositions； 〃That the endeavour after
happiness produces a virtuous mind；〃 is absolutely false； but the
second； 〃That a virtuous mind necessarily produces happiness；〃 is
not absolutely false； but only in so far as virtue is considered as
a form of causality in the sensible world； and consequently only if
I suppose existence in it to be the only sort of existence of a
rational being； it is then only conditionally false。 But as I am not
only justified in thinking that I exist also as a noumenon in a
world of the understanding； but even have in the moral law a purely
intellectual determining principle of my causality （in the sensible
world）； it is not impossible that morality of mind should have a
connection as cause with happiness （as an effect in the sensible
world） if not immediate yet mediate （viz。； through an intelligent
author of nature）； and moreover necessary； while in a system of nature
which is merely an object of the senses； this bination could
never occur except contingently and； therefore； could not suffice
for the summum bonum。
Thus； notwithstanding this seeming conflict of practical reason with
itself； the summum bonum； which is the necessary supreme end of a will
morally determined； is a true object thereof； for it is practically
possible； and the maxims of the will which as regards their matter
refer to it have objective reality； which at first was threatened by
the antinomy that appeared in the connection of morality with
happiness by a general law； but this was merely from a
misconception； because the relation between appearances was taken
for a relation of the things in themselves to these appearances。
When we find ourselves obliged to go so far； namely； to the
connection with an intelligible world； to find the possibility of
the summum bonum； which reason points out to all rational beings as
the goal of all their moral wishes； it must seem strange that；
nevertheless； the philosophers both of ancient and modern times have
been able to find happiness in accurate proportion to virtue even in
this life （in the sensible world）； or have persuaded themselves that
they were conscious thereof。 For Epicurus as well as the Stoics
extolled above everything the happiness that springs from the
consciousness of living virtuously； and the former was not so base
in his practical precepts as one might infer from the principles of
his theory； which he used for explanation and not for action； or as
they were interpreted by many who were misled by his using the term
pleasure for contentment； on the contrary； he reckoned the most
disinterested practice of good amongst the ways of enjoying the most
intimate delight； and his scheme of pleasure （by which he meant
constant cheerfulness of mind） included the moderation and control
of the inclinations； such as the strictest moral philosopher might
require。 He differed from the Stoics chiefly in making this pleasure
the motive； which they very rightly refused to do。 For； on the one
hand； the virtuous Epicurus； like many well…intentioned men of this
day who do not reflect deeply enough on their principles； fell into
the error of presupposing the virtuous disposition in the persons
for whom he wished to provide the springs to virtue （and indeed the
upright man cannot be happy if he is not first conscious of his
uprightness； since with such a character the reproach that his habit
of thought would oblige him to make against himself in case of
transgression and his moral self…condemnation would rob him of all
enjoyment of the pleasantness which his condition might otherwise
contain）。 But the question is： How is such a disposition possible in
the first instance； and such a habit of thought in estimating the
worth of one's existence； since prior to it there can be in the
subject no feeling at all for moral worth？ If a man is virtuous
without being conscious of his integrity in every action； he will
certainly not enjoy life； however favourable fortune may be to him
in its physical circumstances； but can we make him virtuous in the
first instance； in other words； before he esteems the moral worth of
his existence so highly； by praising to him the peace of mind that
would result from the consciousness of an integrity for which he has
no sense？
On the other hand； however； there is here an occasion of a vitium
subreptionis； and as it were of an optical illusion； in the
self…consciousness of what one does as distinguished from what one
feels… an illusion which even the most experienced cannot altogether
avoid。 The moral disposition of mind is necessarily bined with a
consciousness that the will is determined directly by the law。 Now the
consciousness of a determination of the faculty of desire is always
the source of a satisfaction in the resulting action； but this
pleasure； this satisfaction in oneself； is not the determining
principle of the action； on the contrary； the determination of the
will directly by reason is the source of the feeling of pleasure；
and this remains a pure practical not sensible determination of the
faculty of desire。 Now as this determination has exactly the same
effect within in impelling to activity； that a feeling of the pleasure
to be expected from the desired action would have had； we easily
look on what we ourselves do as something which we merely passively
feel； and take the moral spring for a sensible impulse； just as it
happens in the so…called illusion of the senses （in this case the
inner sense）。 It is a sublime thing in human nature to be determined
to actions immediately by a purely rational law； sublime even is the
illusion that regards the subjective side of this capacity of
intellectual determination as something sensible and the effect of a
special sensible feeling （for an intellectual feeling would be a
contradiction）。 It is also of great importance to attend to this
property of our personality and as much as possible to cultivate the
effect of reason on this feeling。 But we must beware lest by falsely
extolling this moral determining principle as a spring； making its
source lie in particular feelings of pleasure （which are in fact
only results）； we degrade and disfigure the true genuine spring； the
law itself； by putting as it were a false foil upon it。 Respect； not
pleasure or enjoyment of happiness； is something for which it is not
possible that reason should have any antecedent feeling as its
foundation （for this would always be sensible and pathological）； and
consciousness of immediate obligation of the will by the law is by
no means analogous to the feeling of pleasure； although in relation to
the faculty of desire it produces the same effect； but from
different sources： it is only by this mode of conception； however；
that we can attain what we are seeking； namely； that actions be done
not merely in accordance with duty （as a result of pleasant feelings）；
but from duty； which must be the true end of all moral cultivation。
Have we not； however； a word which does not express enjoyment； as
happiness does； but indicates a satisfaction in one's existence； an
analogue of the happiness which must necessarily acpany the
consciousness of virtue？ Yes this word is self…contentment which in
its pro