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of the will adequate to determine it； then we could not admit any
higher desire at all。
REMARK I。
It is surprising that men； otherwise acute； can think it possible to
distinguish between higher and lower desires； according as the ideas
which are connected with the feeling of pleasure have their origin
in the senses or in the understanding； for when we inquire what are
the determining grounds of desire； and place them in some expected
pleasantness； it is of no consequence whence the idea of this pleasing
object is derived； but only how much it pleases。 Whether an idea has
its seat and source in the understanding or not； if it can only
determine the choice by presupposing a feeling of pleasure in the
subject； it follows that its capability of determining the choice
depends altogether on the nature of the inner sense； namely； that this
can be agreeably affected by it。 However dissimilar ideas of objects
may be； though they be ideas of the understanding； or even of the
reason in contrast to ideas of sense； yet the feeling of pleasure；
by means of which they constitute the determining principle of the
will （the expected satisfaction which impels the activity to the
production of the object）； is of one and the same kind； not only
inasmuch as it can only be known empirically； but also inasmuch as
it affects one and the same vital force which manifests itself in
the faculty of desire； and in this respect can only differ in degree
from every other ground of determination。 Otherwise； how could we
pare in respect of magnitude two principles of determination； the
ideas of which depend upon different faculties； so as to prefer that
which affects the faculty of desire in the highest degree。 The same
man may return unread an instructive book which he cannot again
obtain； in order not to miss a hunt； he may depart in the midst of a
fine speech； in order not to be late for dinner； he may leave a
rational conversation； such as he otherwise values highly； to take his
place at the gaming…table； he may even repulse a poor man whom he at
other times takes pleasure in benefiting； because he has only just
enough money in his pocket to pay for his admission to the theatre。 If
the determination of his will rests on the feeling of the
agreeableness or disagreeableness that he expects from any cause； it
is all the same to him by what sort of ideas he will be affected。
The only thing that concerns him； in order to decide his choice； is；
how great； how long continued； how easily obtained； and how often
repeated； this agreeableness is。 just as to the man who wants money to
spend； it is all the same whether the gold was dug out of the mountain
or washed out of the sand； provided it is everywhere accepted at the
same value； so the man who cares only for the enjoyment of life does
not ask whether the ideas are of the understanding or the senses；
but only how much and how great pleasure they will give for the
longest time。 It is only those that would gladly deny to pure reason
the power of determining the will； without the presupposition of any
feeling； who could deviate so far from their own exposition as to
describe as quite heterogeneous what they have themselves previously
brought under one and the same principle。 Thus； for example； it is
observed that we can find pleasure in the mere exercise of power； in
the consciousness of our strength of mind in overing obstacles
which are opposed to our designs； in the culture of our mental
talents； etc。； and we justly call these more refined pleasures and
enjoyments； because they are more in our power than others； they do
not wear out； but rather increase the capacity for further enjoyment
of them； and while they delight they at the same time cultivate。 But
to say on this account that they determine the will in a different way
and not through sense； whereas the possibility of the pleasure
presupposes a feeling for it implanted in us； which is the first
condition of this satisfaction； this is just as when ignorant
persons that like to dabble in metaphysics imagine matter so subtle；
so supersubtle that they almost make themselves giddy with it； and
then think that in this way they have conceived it as a spiritual
and yet extended being。 If with Epicurus we make virtue determine
the will only by means of the pleasure it promises； we cannot
afterwards blame him for holding that this pleasure is of the same
kind as those of the coarsest senses。 For we have no reason whatever
to charge him with holding that the ideas by which this feeling is
excited in us belong merely to the bodily senses。 As far as can be
conjectured； he sought the source of many of them in the use of the
higher cognitive faculty； but this did not prevent him； and could
not prevent him； from holding on the principle above stated； that
the pleasure itself which those intellectual ideas give us； and by
which alone they can determine the will； is just of the same kind。
Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher； and yet the
most rarely found。 The ancient Greek schools give us more examples
of it than we find in our syncretistic age； in which a certain shallow
and dishonest system of promise of contradictory principles is
devised； because it mends itself better to a public which is
content to know something of everything and nothing thoroughly； so
as to please every party。
The principle of private happiness； however much understanding and
reason may be used in it； cannot contain any other determining
principles for the will than those which belong to the lower
desires； and either there are no ＇higher＇ desires at all； or pure
reason must of itself alone be practical； that is； it must be able
to determine the will by the mere form of the practical rule without
supposing any feeling； and consequently without any idea of the
pleasant or unpleasant； which is the matter of the desire； and which
is always an empirical condition of the principles。 Then only； when
reason of itself determines the will （not as the servant of the
inclination）； it is really a higher desire to which that which is
pathologically determined is subordinate； and is really； and even
specifically； distinct from the latter； so that even the slightest
admixture of the motives of the latter impairs its strength and
superiority； just as in a mathematical demonstration the least
empirical condition would degrade and destroy its force and value。
Reason； with its practical law； determines the will immediately； not
by means of an intervening feeling of pleasure or pain； not even of
pleasure in the law itself； and it is only because it can； as pure
reason； be practical； that it is possible for it to be legislative。
REMARK II。
To be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational
being； and this； therefore； is inevitably a determining principle of
its faculty of desire。 For we are not in possession originally of
satisfaction with our whole existence… a bliss which would imply a
consciousness of our own independent self…sufficiency this is a
problem imposed upon us by our own finite nature； because we have
wants and these wants regard the matter of our desires； that is；
something that is relative to a subjective feeling of pleasure or
pain； which determines what we need in order to be satisfied with
our condition。 But just because this material principle of
determination can only be empirically known by the subject； it is
impossible to regard this problem as a law； for a law being
objective must contain the very same principle of determination of the
will in all cases and for all rational beings。 For； although the
notion of happiness is in every case the foundation of practical
relation of the objects to the desires； yet it is only a general
name for the subjective determining principles； and determines nothing
specifically； whereas this is what alone we are concerned with in this
practical problem； which cannot be solved at all without such specific
determination。 For it is every man's own special feeling of pleasure
and pain that decides in what he is to place his happiness； and even
in the same subject this will vary with the difference of his wants
according as this feeling changes； and thus a law which is
subjectively necessary （as a law of nature） is objectively a very
contingent practical principle； which can and must be very different
in different subjects and therefore can never furnish a law； since； in
the desire for happiness it is not the form （of conformity to law）
that is decisive； but simply the matter； namely； whether I am to
expect pleasure in following the law； and how much。 Principles of
self…love may； indeed； contain universal precepts of skill （how to
find means to acplish one's purpose）； but in that case they are
merely theoretical principles；* as； for example； how he who would like
to eat bread should contrive a mill； but practical precepts founded on
them can never be universal； for the determining principle of the
desire is based on the feeling pleasure and pain； which can never be
supposed to be universally directed to the same objects。
*Propositions which in mathematics or physics are called practical
ought properly to be called technical。 For they For they have
nothing to do with the determination of the theoretical they only
point out how the certain must is to be produced and are； therefore；
just as theoretical as any propositions which express the connection
of a cause with an effect。 Now whoever chooses the effect must also
choose the cause。
Even supposing； however； that all finite rational beings were
thoroughly agreed as to what were the objects of their feelings of
pleasure and pain； and also as to the means which they must employ
to attain the one and avoid the other； still； they could by no means
set up the principle of self…love as a practical law； for this
unanimity itself would be only contingent。 The principle of
determination would still be only subjectively valid and merely
empirical； and would not possess the necessity which is conceived in
every law； namely； an objective necessity arising from a priori
grounds； unless； indeed； we hold this necessity to be not at all
practical； but merely physical； viz。； that our action is as inevitably
determined by our inclination； as yawning when we see others yawn。
It would be better to maintain that there are no practical laws at
all； but only counsels for the service of our desires； than to raise
merely subjective principles to the rank of practical laws； which have
objective necessity； and not merely subjective； and which must be
known by reason a priori； not by experience （however empirically
universal this may be）。 Even the rules of corresponding phenomena
are only called laws of nature （e。g。； the mechanical laws）； when we
either know them really a priori； or （as in the case of chemical laws）
suppose that they would be known a priori from objective grounds if
our insight reached further。 But in the case of merely subjective
practical principles； it is expressly made a condition that they rest；
not on objective； but on subjective conditions of choice； and hence
that they must always be represented as mere maxims； never as
practical laws。 This second remark seems at first sight to be mere
verbal refinement； but it defines the terms of the most important
distinction which can e into consideration in practical
investigations。
IV。 THEOREM II。
A rational being cannot regard his maxims as practical universal
laws； unless he conceives them as principles which determine the will；
not by their matter； but by their form only。
By the matter of a practical principle I mean the object of the
will。 This object is either the determining ground of the will or it
is not。 In the former case the rule of the will is subjected to an
empirical condition （viz。； the relation of the determining idea to the
feeling of pleasure and pain）； consequently it can not be a
practical law。 Now； when we abstract from a law all matter； i。e。；
every object of the will （as a determining principle）； nothing is left
but the mere form of a universal legislation。 Therefore； either a
rational being cannot conceive his subjective practical principles；
that is； his maxims； as being at the same time universal laws； or he
must suppose that their mere form； by which they are fitted for
universal legislation； is alone what makes them practical laws。
REMARK。
The monest understanding can distinguish without instruction what
form of maxim is adapted for universal legislation； and what is not。
Suppose； for example； that I have made it my maxim to increase my
fortune by every safe means。 Now； I have a deposit in my hands； the
owner of which is dead and has left no writing about it。 This is
just the case for my maxim。 I desire then to know whether that maxim
can also bold good as a universal practical law。 I apply it；
therefore； to the present case； and ask whether it could take the form
of a law； and consequently whether I can by my maxim at the same
time give such a law as this； that everyone may deny a deposit of
which no one can produce a proof。 I at on