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would mean that there does not exist in him even the possibility of
a desire that would tempt him to deviate from them； for to overe
such a desire always costs the subject some sacrifice and therefore
requires self…pulsion； that is； inward constraint to something that
one does not quite like to do； and no creature can ever reach this
stage of moral disposition。 For； being a creature； and therefore
always dependent with respect to what be requires for plete
satisfaction； he can never be quite free from desires and
inclinations； and as these rest on physical causes； they can never
of themselves coincide with the moral law； the sources of which are
quite different； and therefore they make it necessary to found the
mental disposition of one's maxims on moral obligation； not on ready
inclination； but on respect； which demands obedience to the law；
even though one may not like it； not on love； which apprehends no
inward reluctance of the will towards the law。 Nevertheless； this
latter； namely； love to the law （which would then cease to be a
mand； and then morality； which would have passed subjectively
into holiness； would cease to be virtue） must be the constant though
unattainable goal of his endeavours。 For in the case of what we highly
esteem； but yet （on account of the consciousness of our weakness）
dread； the increased facility of satisfying it changes the most
reverential awe into inclination； and respect into love； at least this
would be the perfection of a disposition devoted to the law； if it
were possible for a creature to attain it。
*This law is in striking contrast with the principle of private
happiness which some make the supreme principle of morality。 This
would be expressed thus： Love thyself above everything； and God and
thy neighbour for thine own sake。
This reflection is intended not so much to clear up the
evangelical mand just cited； in order to prevent religious
fanaticism in regard to love of God； but to define accurately the
moral disposition with regard directly to our duties towards men；
and to check； or if possible prevent； a merely moral fanaticism
which infects many persons。 The stage of morality on which man （and；
as far as we can see； every rational creature） stands is respect for
the moral law。 The disposition that he ought to have in obeying this
is to obey it from duty； not from spontaneous inclination； or from
an endeavour taken up from liking and unbidden； and this proper
moral condition in which he can always be is virtue； that is； moral
disposition militant； and not holiness in the fancied possession of
a perfect purity of the disposition of the will。 It is nothing but
moral fanaticism and exaggerated self…conceit that is infused into the
mind by exhortation to actions as noble； sublime； and magnanimous；
by which men are led into the delusion that it is not duty； that is；
respect for the law； whose yoke （an easy yoke indeed； because reason
itself imposes it on us） they must bear； whether they like it or
not； that constitutes the determining principle of their actions；
and which always humbles them while they obey it； fancying that
those actions are expected from them； not from duty； but as pure
merit。 For not only would they； in imitating such deeds from such a
principle； not have fulfilled the spirit of the law in the least；
which consists not in the legality of the action （without regard to
principle）； but in the subjection of the mind to the law； not only
do they make the motives pathological （seated in sympathy or
self…love）； not moral （in the law）； but they produce in this way a
vain； high…flying； fantastic way of thinking； flattering themselves
with a spontaneous goodness of heart that needs neither spur nor
bridle； for which no mand is needed； and thereby forgetting their
obligation； which they ought to think of rather than merit。 Indeed
actions of others which are done with great sacrifice； and merely
for the sake of duty； may be praised as noble and sublime； but only so
far as there are traces which suggest that they were done wholly out
of respect for duty and not from excited feelings。 If these；
however； are set before anyone as examples to be imitated； respect for
duty （which is the only true moral feeling） must be employed as the
motive… this severe holy precept which never allows our vain self…love
to dally with pathological impulses （however analogous they may be
to morality）； and to take a pride in meritorious worth。 Now if we
search we shall find for all actions that are worthy of praise a law
of duty which mands； and does not leave us to choose what may be
agreeable to our inclinations。 This is the only way of representing
things that can give a moral training to the soul； because it alone is
capable of solid and accurately defined principles。
If fanaticism in its most general sense is a deliberate over
stepping of the limits of human reason； then moral fanaticism is
such an over stepping of the bounds that practical pure reason sets to
mankind； in that it forbids us to place the subjective determining
principle of correct actions； that is； their moral motive； in anything
but the law itself； or to place the disposition which is thereby
brought into the maxims in anything but respect for this law； and
hence mands us to take as the supreme vital principle of all
morality in men the thought of duty； which strikes down all
arrogance as well as vain self…love。
If this is so； it is not only writers of romance or sentimental
educators （although they may be zealous opponents of
sentimentalism）； but sometimes even philosophers； nay； even the
severest of all； the Stoics； that have brought in moral fanaticism
instead of a sober but wise moral discipline； although the
fanaticism of the latter was more heroic； that of the former of an
insipid； effeminate character； and we may； without hypocrisy； say of
the moral teaching of the Gospel； that it first； by the purity of
its moral principle； and at the same time by its suitability to the
limitations of finite beings； brought all the good conduct of men
under the discipline of a duty plainly set before their eyes； which
does not permit them to indulge in dreams of imaginary moral
perfections； and that it also set the bounds of humility （that is；
self…knowledge） to self…conceit as well as to self…love； both which
are ready to mistake their limits。
Duty！ Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing
charming or insinuating； but requirest submission； and yet seekest not
to move the will by threatening aught that would arouse natural
aversion or terror； but merely holdest forth a law which of itself
finds entrance into the mind； and yet gains reluctant reverence
（though not always obedience）； a law before which all inclinations are
dumb； even though they secretly counter…work it； what origin is
there worthy of thee； and where is to be found the root of thy noble
descent which proudly rejects all kindred with the inclinations； a
root to be derived from which is the indispensable condition of the
only worth which men can give themselves？
It can be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself
（as a part of the world of sense）； a power which connects him with
an order of things that only the understanding can conceive； with a
world which at the same time mands the whole sensible world； and
with it the empirically determinable existence of man in time； as well
as the sum total of all ends （which totality alone suits such
unconditional practical laws as the moral）。 This power is nothing
but personality； that is； freedom and independence on the mechanism of
nature； yet； regarded also as a faculty of a being which is subject to
special laws； namely； pure practical laws given by its own reason；
so that the person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to
his own personality as belonging to the intelligible ＇supersensible＇
world。 It is then not to be wondered at that man； as belonging to both
worlds； must regard his own nature in reference to its second and
highest characteristic only with reverence； and its laws with the
highest respect。
On this origin are founded many expressions which designate the
worth of objects according to moral ideas。 The moral law is holy
（inviolable）。 Man is indeed unholy enough； but he must regard humanity
in his own person as holy。 In all creation every thing one chooses and
over which one has any power； may be used merely as means； man
alone； and with him every rational creature； is an end in himself。
By virtue of the autonomy of his freedom he is the subject of the
moral law； which is holy。 just for this reason every will； even
every person's own individual will； in relation to itself； is
restricted to the condition of agreement with the autonomy of the
rational being； that is to say； that it is not to be subject to any
purpose which cannot accord with a law which might arise from the will
of the passive subject himself； the latter is； therefore； never to
be employed merely as means； but as itself also； concurrently； an end。
We justly attribute this condition even to the Divine will； with
regard to the rational beings in the world； which are His creatures；
since it rests on their personality； by which alone they are ends in
themselves。
This respect…inspiring idea of personality which sets before our
eyes the sublimity of our nature （in its higher aspect）； while at
the same time it shows us the want of accord of our conduct with it
and thereby strikes down self…conceit； is even natural to the
monest reason and easily observed。 Has not every even moderately
honourable man sometimes found that； where by an otherwise inoffensive
lie he might either have withdrawn himself from an unpleasant
business； or even have procured some advantages for a loved and
well…deserving friend； he has avoided it solely lest he should despise
himself secretly in his own eyes？ When an upright man is in the
greatest distress； which he might have avoided if he could only have
disregarded duty； is he not sustained by the consciousness that he has
maintained humanity in its proper dignity in his own person and
honoured it； that he has no reason to be ashamed of himself in his own
sight； or to dread the inward glance of self…examination？ This
consolation is not happiness； it is not even the smallest part of
it； for no one would wish to have occasion for it； or would；
perhaps； even desire a life in such circumstances。 But he lives； and
he cannot endure that he should be in his own eyes unworthy of life。
This inward peace is therefore merely negative as regards what can
make life pleasant； it is； in fact； only the escaping the danger of
sinking in personal worth； after everything else that is valuable
has been lost。 It is the effect of a respect for something quite
different from life； something in parison and contrast with which
life with all its enjoyment has no value。 He still lives only
because it is his duty； not because he finds anything pleasant in
life。
Such is the nature of the true motive of pure practical reason； it
is no other than the pure moral law itself； inasmuch as it makes us
conscious of the sublimity of our own supersensible existence and
subjectively produces respect for their higher nature in men who are
also conscious of their sensible existence and of the consequent
dependence of their pathologically very susceptible nature。 Now with
this motive may be bined so many charms and satisfactions of life
that even on this account alone the most prudent choice of a
rational Epicurean reflecting on the greatest advantage of life
would declare itself on the side of moral conduct； and it may even
be advisable to join this prospect of a cheerful enjoyment of life
with that supreme motive which is already sufficient of itself； but
only as a counterpoise to the attractions which vice does not fail
to exhibit on the opposite side； and not so as； even in the smallest
degree； to place in this the proper moving power when duty is in
question。 For that would be just the same as to wish to taint the
purity of the moral disposition in its source。 The majesty of duty has
nothing to do with enjoyment of life； it has its special law and its
special tribunal； and though the two should be never so well shaken
together to be given well mixed； like medicine； to the sick soul；
yet they will soon separate of themselves； and if they do not； the
former will not act； and although physical life might gain somewhat in
force； the moral life would fade away irrecoverably。
Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason。
By the critical examination of a science； or of a portion of it；
which constitutes a system by itself； I understand the inquiry and
proof why it must have this and no other systematic form； when we
pare it with another system which is based on a similar faculty
of knowledge。 Now practical and speculative reason are based on the
same faculty； so far as both are pure reason。 Therefore the difference
in their systematic form must be determined by the parison of both；
and the ground of this must be assigned。
The Analytic of pure theoretic reason had to do with the knowledge
of such objects as may have been given t